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ENGAGING OCEANIA
Captain Sea Sovereign Thomas, U.S. Marine Corps
The fourteen island nations of Oceania are weak by any traditional measure ofstate power. They are mostly small and poor, with zero military muscle and
little diplomatic clout. On a map of the Pacific these microstates appear almost
like tossed sand, widely dispersed and hardly noticeable in the great blue ex-
panse between the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Australia. But the small size
and gross domestic products of these states conceal a disproportionate eco-
nomic, political, and military potential. As a consequence, this region has re-
ceived considerable attention from Beijing over the past decade as it moves to
expand its influence in far-flung capitals around the world. China now has more
diplomats in Oceania than does any other nation, its bilateral aid is expanding
rapidly, and its trade with the region is two to three times larger than that of the
United States.1 While growing competition for influence is not necessarily a
zero-sum game, neither is it risk free. Washington cannot afford to neglect its
long-standing links with these saltwater states and should better employ the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM)—its principal lever of military and diplomatic
power in the Pacific—by elevating the region’s importance and making current
“theater security cooperation” more robust.
Oceania deserves Washington’s increased attention for three reasons. First, its
marine resources in fish are tremendous at a time
when global stocks are on the brink of collapse. Fur-
ther, it is home to some of the world’s most vibrant
and healthy coral reefs, invaluable in both economic
and ecological terms. Second, the states of Oceania
represent a sizable bloc of nations whose collective
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diplomatic weight is considerable. Maintaining strong American influence in
the region, especially as Beijing moves assertively to establish itself as a new
source of influence, will help to enhance regional support for Washington’s for-
eign policy agenda. Third, the islands of Oceania straddle the geopolitically sig-
nificant maritime routes between the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
East Asia, and Guam, where America is significantly expanding its military pres-
ence. In the event of any large-scale U.S. military action in the western Pacific
(over Taiwan, for instance), these islands could become logistically crucial.
ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL VALUE: FISH
The world is facing a crisis in global fish supply. Fish stocks have collapsed in
nearly one-third of open-sea fisheries (that is, they have declined to less than 10
percent of their original yield), 25 percent of the world’s marine fish stocks are
overexploited (depleting faster than they are recovering), and an additional 50
percent are fully exploited (depleting at the pace of recovery).2 As stocks become
further exhausted, competition for access to fish and other seafood will become
increasingly intense.
The Pacific Ocean is home to three of the four most productive fishing areas
of the world, with the northwest Pacific being the most abundant and the west-
ern central Pacific—where Oceania lies—the fourth.3 This maritime space is
also the planet’s most important tuna fishing area, producing about one-third of
the global total.4 These considerable resources are contained in island states’ ex-
clusive economic zones (EEZs), which stretch two hundred nautical miles from
the coastline and wherein nations enjoy jurisdiction over the water column and
all seabed and subsoil resources. The microstates of Oceania, many of which in-
clude sprawling chains of atolls, control vast swaths of saltwater territory out of
all proportion to their tiny landmasses. For example, the Republic of
Kiribati—half the size of Rhode Island (the smallest American state)—has an
EEZ more than five times the size of Texas and eight times the size of California.
In total, the fourteen nations of the region have rights to twenty million square
kilometers of sea, more than twice the size of the continental United States (see
map).5 Washington’s economic interests in maintaining access to these marine
resources are complemented by strong ecological ones: not only is there value in
supporting conservation regimes that protect fish and coral reefs from
overexploitation, but there are scientific and purely environmental reasons for
preserving Oceania’s exceptional saltwater ecosystems. Consider the fact that
President George W. Bush created the world’s largest marine sanctuaries—three
protected areas totaling five hundred thousand square kilometers—in the very
heart of the region’s saltwater expanse.6
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POLITICAL VALUE: VOTES
Despite wide geographic distribution
and diversity in forms of govern-
ment, the nations of Oceania have
broadly similar domestic concerns
and foreign-policy goals. Domesti-
cally, nearly all island states confront
poverty, lack of sustainable economic
development, ineffective government
institutions, corruption, and increas-
ingly, transnational crime. Region-
ally, natural disasters, including
cyclones, droughts, tsunamis, and
rising sea levels associated with cli-
mate change, are significant chal-
lenges; further, poaching of marine
resources—illegal, unregulated, and
unreported (IUU) fishing—is a
growing problem faced by all island countries.7
Largely because of these shared challenges, a lack of local military competi-
tion, and a common maritime experience, there is great concert among the four-
teen states of Oceania. This relative unity has spawned a considerable level of
cooperation, resulting in the conclusion of several multiparty treaties (e.g., the
South Pacific Tuna Treaty) and the development of healthy regional institutions,
principally the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Is-
lands Forum (PIF). These long-standing international organizations (the SPC
was established in 1947 and the PIF in 1971) have expansive mandates in the
fields of economic growth and integration, good governance, and security, and
in turn they oversee numerous suborganizations (the PIF administers eleven)
that collaborate on concerns ranging from fishing and tourism to power utilities
management and environmental policy. The issues of common interest are nu-
merous, and the vigorous governmental links that crisscross Oceania are illus-
trative of a surprising level of regional integration. In fact, the region’s economic
agenda is so closely aligned that Oceania’s states are currently entertaining the
adoption of a common market.8
Because of their close association and shared interests, these nations repre-
sent a sort of “maritime bloc” likely to vote along similar lines in international
forums like the United Nations. Smart American diplomacy can translate this
regional diplomatic potential into broad support for U.S. positions in places like
the World Trade Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the
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Asian Development Bank (ADB), where Pacific island votes are highly signifi-
cant. (Consider the fact that Oceania, if viewed collectively, ranks ninth of
sixty-seven nations in total votes in the ADB, with 75 percent of the voting
power of China or India.)9 Oceania’s states also occupy a position of consider-
able collective weight within the various governance mechanisms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which appears increas-
ingly likely for near-term U.S. ratification.10 Besides constituting nearly 10 per-
cent of signatory members, these countries often furnish critical leadership; for
example, the first secretary general of the International Seabed Authority, one of
the three subsidiary bodies of UNCLOS, was a Fijian who held the post for
twelve years, from 1996 to 2008.11 Given the Obama administration’s renewed
emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism, the search for votes and influence
in international organizations is likely to receive greater emphasis. Because of
the close alignment of its governments, “winning” all fourteen of Oceania’s
votes is a far easier task than, say, the twelve votes of South America, a region
where amity is far less common.
MILITARY VALUE: ISLAND HOPPING REDUX?
With the impending move of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam—the emerg-
ing geographic linchpin of American strategy in the western Pacific—Oceania’s
importance grows greatly. Its sprawling island states are far closer to Guam than
Okinawa is (by more than 1,200 nautical miles, the maritime distance from San
Diego to Seattle), and bisect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between
the United States and its allies Australia and New Zealand. In the event of a ma-
jor conflagration in East Asian waters, perhaps involving Taiwan and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC), American SLOCs would pass through Oceania.
Given Beijing’s strategic aim of expanding its naval defensive boundaries well
beyond local waters and into the Marianas and Micronesia (the Chinese operat-
ing constructs known as the first and second “island chains”) and its focus on
developing anti–aircraft carrier capabilities through land-based missiles and
submarines, it is clear that Chinese leaders plan to contest the maritime com-
mons in the future, if push comes to shove.12
If the risks to carrier operations around Taiwan became too great, American
military commanders would likely be compelled to fall back and disperse their
forces on China’s maritime periphery rather than in concentrations that could
be easily targeted. As U.S. forces “phased” into the theater, building a critical
mass along China’s southern flank, the islands of Oceania could provide a signif-
icant logistical function as forces “hopped” into the western Pacific, evoking
memories of American experiences in World War II. The region’s runways and
ports, not to mention its diplomatic support, would be of tremendous value.
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In the broader strategic context, Oceania provides the United States with geo-
graphic alternatives as Washington reorients its East Asian military posture,
moving troops from Japanese (Okinawa) to American soil (Guam) and reduc-
ing its force structure in Korea. The ability to operate from Oceania’s sea and air-
ports could simultaneously afford strategic depth and allow the United States to
remain centrally positioned within Asian geopolitics—being operationally near
allies without aggravating Japanese or Korean domestic affairs.
CHINA’S INTERESTS IN THE REGION
Beijing’s principal interests in the region are not military but political and eco-
nomic. It is primarily concerned with reversing diplomatic recognition of Tai-
wan; the Pacific remains one of the last critical diplomatic battlegrounds
between the two Chinas. Only twenty-three states worldwide recognize the gov-
ernment in Taipei, and six of them are in Oceania—Kiribati, the Marshall Is-
lands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. This grouping represents
the world’s second-largest regional cluster of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan,
and Beijing is intent upon chipping away at this support for what it considers a
breakaway province.13 Offering carrots and sticks, China has rapidly increased
its economic aid to nations that recognize Beijing exclusively, giving a regional
total of $300 million in 2007 (a ninefold increase over the preceding three
years).14 At the same time, nations that have switched their allegiance to Taipei
have seen their economic assistance drop to zero and their Chinese embassies
shuttered.
Beijing’s secondary interests in Oceania are in access to natural resources like
fish, timber, and minerals (prospective seabed mineral resources are also a
long-term consideration). China is the world’s largest producer and exporter of
fish and is eager to have greater access to the region’s gargantuan EEZs. It has
fishing fleets permanently based in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)
and Fiji, and it guarantees continued access by funding large-scale industry-
related projects. (Examples are fish-processing plants in Vanuatu, the Cook Is-
lands, and Papua New Guinea [PNG] and the construction of the regional
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission headquarters in the FSM.)
Beijing has also invested substantially in the few nations with territorial re-
sources, importing significant quantities of timber from the Solomon Islands
and PNG and investing heavily in the latter’s mineral sector—notably, funding
the $651 million Ramu nickel and cobalt mine in 2006.15
Chinese trade with the region has multiplied appreciably, from $743 million
in 2006 (by comparison, U.S. trade was $393 million) to approximately $2 bil-
lion in 2007, with a stated goal of $3 billion in total trade by 2010.16 As aid and
trade increase, Beijing seeks to build an alternative source of influence in the
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Pacific—a region where governments are weary of being treated by donors as ir-
responsible, immature, and crooked. The PRC offers a new, attractive paradigm
by granting aid, preferential loans, and tariff reductions without preconditions,
all the while treating Pacific governments with respect, evinced by senior-level
official visits, which have included trips by the foreign minister and premier,
Wen Jiabao.17
ENGAGING SALTWATER STATES
While Beijing’s economic presence in Oceania may be on the ascent, it is not
necessarily at the expense of American political influence. The United States has
strong and enduring ties with the nations of Oceania built on a long history of
economic and diplomatic engagement, and despite the PRC’s increased activity,
America-friendly Australia remains the dominant power in the region. Still,
while competition in this increasingly important maritime area is not inevitably
zero-sum, neither is it free of consequences. To hedge against rising Chinese in-
fluence, and because of the region’s growing economic, political, and military
potential, it is in Washington’s strategic interest to enhance its relationship with
Oceania. USPACOM is best poised to strengthen American ties by augmenting
current theater security cooperation.
The depth and breadth of USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) for its entire area of responsibility—a plan that includes at least five or
six annual military exercises, frequent senior official visits and exchanges, mil-
lions of dollars’ worth of humanitarian and civic assistance activities, a myriad
of multinational security and health-related training conferences, and the subsi-
dization of dozens of international students at various American military edu-
cational institutions—make it the “Cadillac” of the regional combatant
commands.18 With respect to Oceania, humanitarian assistance is the TSCP’s
major area of focus. The annual naval PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP Program, born out
of international cooperation following the 2004 Asian tsunami, has provided
medical, dental, veterinarian, educational, and engineering support to seven of
the nations of Oceania since 2007.19 This and other assistance programs have
been received extremely well in the region and considered highly successful.
Outside of these vigorous humanitarian efforts, however, the TSCP is rather
thin as it affects Oceania. There are certainly elements that deserve continua-
tion. For example, island states are well represented at USPACOM’s regularly
sponsored security seminars and health workshops and in programs to support
international collaboration, like the Multinational Planning Augmentation
Team. Further, Pacific military officers and officials are regular students at the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, and a handful have attended
the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island (four of fourteen states have
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been represented there—Fiji, PNG, Samoa, and Tonga).20 What the TSCP lacks
for Oceania is a set of specific initiatives that treat the region as a distinct entity,
aim to build upon its shared maritime identity, and address systemic problems
in island government capacity.
The first order of business is to develop a regional multilateral exercise.
USPACOM sponsors at least sixteen major international military exercises with
relative frequency, including notables like COBRA GOLD and RIMPAC and bilat-
eral exercises like GARUDA SHIELD (United States–Indonesia).21 None of them,
however, incorporate any of Oceania’s nations.22 An annual Pacific-island secu-
rity exercise focused on disaster response and involving government institu-
tions, police, military forces, and nongovernmental organizations could assist
states in building capacity, improving intra- and intergovernmental communi-
cations, and enhancing interoperability (especially with the United States).
Branded, perhaps, “PACIFIC NAVIGATOR,” to resonate with island peoples who
are immensely proud of their maritime histories, this exercise could be orga-
nized and executed under the leadership of Pacific Command’s Center for Excel-
lence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, an organization
with experience in facilitating such drills.23 The South Pacific tsunami of Sep-
tember 2009, which killed nearly two hundred, displaced thousands, and re-
sulted in millions of dollars’ worth of damage in Samoa, American Samoa, and
Tonga, could provide a ready case study in disaster response and mitigation.
Second, in anticipation of PACIFIC NAVIGATOR, USPACOM would conduct a
focused infrastructure upgrade for one airfield or port within the prospective
host nation (which would rotate annually). The improvement would be more
than cosmetic but far less than a major overhaul (e.g., upgrading of mainte-
nance facilities, radar, pierside storage, and the like). During the annual exercise,
this improved facility would be a focal point. The infrastructure enhancement
program would improve the host nation’s ability to conduct its own disaster-
response operations and to receive international support in the form of supplies
and relief workers delivered by aircraft and ship. The second-order benefits
would include an improved facility better able to support a range of host nation
missions—counternarcotics, rescue, monitoring of illegal fishing, etc.; positive
local publicity for American forces; improved diplomatic relations commensu-
rate with direct monetary assistance; and an airfield or port better able to receive
U.S. military forces in the event of a contingency.
Finally, USPACOM should reshape its military exchange program for the re-
gion’s security officers. Only three of Oceania’s states have regular military
forces, and as a consequence, many traditional military and naval roles fall to po-
lice units, including maritime functions associated with homeland defense.24 In
order to improve island states’ ability to conduct these missions, especially those
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that are likely to become more frequent and difficult (the monitoring and pre-
vention of IUU fishing, for instance), Oceania’s police and naval personnel need
to train with the best, the U.S. Coast Guard. While an “exchange” program as
such would be inappropriate, due to the limited opportunities and platforms
available among Pacific-island defense forces, a robust training program placing
Oceania’s security personnel on Coast Guard vessels could be highly effective.
The aim would be to expose a pair (one midgrade officer, one junior officer/senior
enlisted) to a Coast Guard ship or sector for a period of three to four months.
Ideally, two pairs from different nations could be assigned to the same com-
mand, reinforcing regional confidence building and encouraging future collab-
oration. These exchange personnel would be placed with ships conducting a
range of missions (perhaps focusing on the disruption of IUU fishing), all the
while being exposed to the professionalism of the men and women of the U.S.
Coast Guard.
Of course, any American initiatives in Oceania that fail to leverage the re-
sources and influence of Washington’s Pacific allies would be badly flawed. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, two of America’s strongest partners, are also the two
most influential nations in the neighborhood—trading in the highest volumes,
contributing the most aid and government support to Oceania, and in some
cases providing for the defense of island states. (For example, Australia provides
for the defense of Nauru and New Zealand for the Cook Islands, Niue, and Sa-
moa; Kiribati is a shared responsibility.)25 In addition to their sheer presence in
the region, Canberra and Wellington have long histories of military engagement
with, and involvement in, island nations, most recently demonstrated by the
Australian-led multinational peacekeeping operation in the Solomon Islands,
which included troops from New Zealand, PNG, and Tonga.26 Other allies too
wield considerable influence in the Pacific as a consequence of their colonial his-
tories (particularly France) or current economic relationships (Japan and South
Korea, for instance). American policy makers would be wise to consider an en-
gagement strategy that incorporates the unique strengths of these partners as
well as their nuanced understandings of regional relationships, grounded in
their long involvement in the Pacific.
REBUILDING BRIDGES
Preoccupied with counterterrorism and democracy building in the Middle East,
the United States has allowed its relationship with Oceania to wither while
Beijing has expanded its strategic aims and efforts in the region. As Chinese
trade and aid have skyrocketed, the United States has disengaged, closing its U.S.
Agency for International Development regional office, halving the number of
Peace Corps missions, and eliminating its U.S. Information Agency presence in
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Oceania.27 It is time to renew America’s relationship with this strategically cru-
cial maritime area. By building on current successful initiatives, U.S. Pacific
Command is well placed to strengthen links with and between island govern-
ments, enhance regional capacity to manage future security challenges, and, in
turn, restore American influence in a region with tremendous economic, politi-
cal, and military value.
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